COMPENSATION FOR NUCLEAR ACCIDENTS

 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nuclear_Liability_Bill 

(Important sections of the Indian nuclear liability bill 2010)
http://www.idsa.in/system/files/ib_CivilNuclearLiabilityBill.pdf (Bill with comments)
http://www.dianuke.org/rules-the-civil-liability-for-nuclear-damage-bill-2010/ (Rules under the Act)

http://radscihealth.org/rsh/realism/RealismApp1a-attch.pdf  (Consequences of reactor accidents)

http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/op-ed/article475974.ece   (Is life cheap in India)
http://www.indianexpress.com/news/a-guide-to-indias-civil-liability-for-nuclear-damage-bill-2010/661979/ (Implications of the nuclear liability bill)

http://www.clraindia.org/include/CLRA%20Nuke%20Bill%20policy%20brief.pdf
 http://airwebworld.com/articles/index.php?article=1529
 http://lawmin.nic.in/ld/regionallanguages
http://lawmin.nic.in/ld/regionallanguages/THE%20CIVIL%20LIABILITY%20OF%20NUCLEAR%20DAMAGE%20ACT,2010.%20%2838%20OF2010%29.pdf (CIVIL LIABILITY ACT)
http://www.npcil.nic.in/pdf/Civil_Nucler_Liability.pdf (RULES)
 http://toxicswatch.blogspot.in/2011/11/governments-rules-on-nuclear-liability.html
(comments on Rules)  

 

Price-Anderson Act

http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/fact-sheets/funds-fs.html

The Price-Anderson Act, which became law on September 2, 1957, was designed to ensure that adequate funds would be available to satisfy liability claims of members of the public for personal injury and property damage in the event of a nuclear accident involving a commercial nuclear power plant. The legislation helped encourage private investment in commercial nuclear power by placing a cap, or ceiling on the total amount of liability each holder of a nuclear power plant licensee faced in the event of an accident. Over the years, the "limit of liability" for a nuclear accident has increased the insurance pool to more than $12 billion.

Under existing policy, owners of nuclear power plants pay a premium each year for $375 million in private insurance for offsite liability coverage for each reactor unit. This primary or first tier, insurance is supplemented by a second tier. In the event a nuclear accident, causes damages in excess of $375 million, each licensee would be assessed a prorated share of the excess up to $111.9 million. With 104 reactors currently licensed to operate, this secondary tier of funds contains about $11.6 billion. If 15 percent of these funds are expended, prioritization of the remaining amount would be left to a federal district court. If the second tier is depleted, Congress is committed to determine whether additional disaster relief is required.

The only insurance pool writing nuclear insurance, American Nuclear Insurers, is comprised of property-casualty insurance companies. About 13 percent of the pool's total liability capacity comes from foreign sources. The average annual premium for a single-unit reactor site is $830,000. The premium for a second or third reactor at the same site is discounted to reflect a sharing of limits.

Claims resulting from nuclear accidents are covered under Price-Anderson; for that reason, all property and liability insurance policies issued in the U.S. exclude nuclear accidents. Claims can include any incident (including those that come about because of theft or sabotage) in the course of transporting nuclear fuel to a reactor site; in the storage of nuclear fuel or waste at a site; in the operation of a reactor, including the discharge of radioactive effluent; and in the transportation of irradiated nuclear fuel and nuclear waste from the reactor.

Price-Anderson does not require coverage for spent fuel or nuclear waste stored at interim storage facilities, transportation of nuclear fuel or waste that is not either to or from a nuclear reactor, or acts of theft or sabotage occurring after planned transportation has ended.

Insurance under Price-Anderson covers bodily injury, sickness, disease or resulting death, property damage and loss as well as reasonable living expenses for individuals evacuated. The Energy Policy Act of 2005 extended the Price-Anderson Act to December 31, 2025.

Price-Anderson in Action

When the accident at Three Mile Island Nuclear Power Plant in Middletown, Pa., occurred in 1979, the Price-Anderson Act provided liability insurance to the public. Coverage was available to those in need by the time Pennsylvania’s governor recommended the evacuation of pregnant women and families with young children who lived near the plant. At the time of the accident, private insurers had $140 million of coverage available in the first tier pools. Insurance adjusters advanced money to evacuated families in order to cover their living expenses, only requesting that unused funds be returned; recipients responded by sending back several thousand dollars. The insurance pools also reimbursed over 600 individuals and families for wages lost as a result of the accident.

In addition to the immediate concerns, the insurance pools were later used to settle a class-action suit for economic loss filed on behalf of residents who lived near Three Mile Island. Because the Price-Anderson Act allowed for a certain amount of money to be spent on each accident, it covered court fees as well. The last of the litigation surrounding the accident was resolved in 2003.

To date, the insurance pools have paid approximately $71 million in claims and litigation costs associated with the Three Mile Island accident.

Disaster Relief Funds-Stafford Act

Disaster relief is also available to State and local governments under the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act if a nuclear accident is declared an emergency or major disaster by the President. The Act is designed to provide early assistance to accident victims. Under a cost-sharing provision, State governments pay 25 percent of the cost of temporary housing for up to 18 months, home repair, temporary mortgage or rental payments and other "unmet needs" of disaster victims; the federal government pays the balance.

NOTE:  Private Insurance (First Tier) industry pays $375M  + each industry gets  $11,600 M out of cooperative pool in the Second Tier. So totally each accident pays $11,600+$375 = $11,975M as compensation. To replenish the common pool 104 reactors pay $112M , totaling pool of $12 billion (common fund)

Liability for Nuclear Damage

http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/inf67.html

• Operators of nuclear power plants are liable for any damage caused by them, regardless of fault. They therefore normally take out insurance for third-party liability, and in most countries they are required to do so.   
• The potential cross boundary consequences of a nuclear accident require an international nuclear liability regime, so national laws are supplemented by a number of international conventions. 
• Liability is limited by both international conventions and by national legislation, so that beyond the limit (normally covered by insurance) the state can accept responsibility as insurer of last resort, as in all other aspects of industrial society. 

An illustrative exchange on insuring nuclear power plants  It is commonly asserted that nuclear power stations are not covered by insurance, and that insurance companies don't want to know about them either for first-party insurance of the plant itself or third-party liability for accidents. This is incorrect, and the misconception was addressed as follows in 2006 by a broker who had been responsible for a nuclear insurance pool: "it is wrong [to believe] that insurers will not touch nuclear power stations. In fact, wherever they are available to private sector insurers, Western-designed nuclear installations are sought-after business because of their high engineering and risk management standards. This has been the case for fifty years." He elaborated: "My comment refers very much to the world scene and is not contentious. Apart from Three Mile Island, the claim experience has been very good. Chernobyl was not insured. Significantly, because Chernobyl was of a design that would not have been an acceptable risk at the time, notably the lack of a containment structure, the accident had no impact on premium rates for Western plants.

The structure of insurance of nuclear installations is different from ordinary industrial risks. Insurance (direct damage and third party liability insurance) is placed with either one of the many national insurance pools which brings together insurance capacity for nuclear risks from the domestic insurers in the local country, or into one of the mutual insurance associations such as Nuclear Electric Insurance Limited (NEIL) based in USA or EMANI and ELINI based in Europe. These are set up by the nuclear industry itself. Third Party liability involves international conventions, national legislation channeling liability to the operators, and pooling of insurance capacity in more than twenty countries. The national nuclear insurance pool approach was particularly developed in the UK in 1956 as a way of marshalling insurance capacity for the possibility of serious accidents. Other national pools that followed were modeled on the UK pool - now known as Nuclear Risk Insurers Limited, and based in London. The mutualisation of insurance risks began with the forerunner of NEIL in 1973 

Ever since the first commercial nuclear power reactors were built, there has been concern about the possible effects of a severe nuclear accident, coupled with the question of who would be liable for third-party consequences.  This concern was based on the supposition that even with reactor designs licensable in the West, a cooling failure causing the core to melt would result in major consequences akin to those of the Chernobyl disaster. It was supposed that damage caused could be extensive, creating the need for compulsory third party insurance schemes for nuclear operators, and international conventions to deal with transboundary damage. On the other hand it was realized that nuclear power makes a valuable contribution to meeting the world’s energy demands and that in order for it to continue doing so, individual operator liability had to be curtailed and beyond a certain level, risk had to be socialized.   Experience over five decades has shown the fear of catastrophe to be exaggerated, though the local impact of a severe accident or terrorist attack was shown at Fukushima in 2011 to be considerable, even with minor direct human casualties. Prior to that, the Three Mile Island accident in 1979 was taken as being indicative.

Nuclear liability principles 

Most conventions and laws regarding nuclear third party liability have at their heart the following principles:

• Strict liability of the nuclear operator 
• Exclusive liability of the operator of a nuclear installation
• Compensation without discrimination based on nationality, domicile or residence
• Mandatory financial coverage of the operator's liability 
• Exclusive jurisdiction (only courts of the State in which the nuclear accident occurs have jurisdiction)
• Limitation of liability in amount and in time

Strict liability means that the victim is relieved from proving fault. In the case of an accident the operator (power plant, enrichment/fuel facility, reprocessing facility) is liable whether or not any fault or negligence can be proven. This simplifies the litigation process, removing any obstacles, especially such as might exist with the burden of proof, given the complexity of nuclear science. In layman’s terms: strict liability means a claimant does not need to prove how an accident occurred.

Exclusive liability of the operator means that in the case of an accident, all claims are to be brought against the nuclear operator. This legal channeling is regardless of the accident's cause. By inference suppliers or builders of the plant are protected from public litigation in the case of an accident. Again this simplifies the process because claimants do not have to figure out who is responsible – under law it will be the nuclear operator.

Mandatory financial coverage means that the operator must maintain insurance cover, and it ensures that funds will be made available by the operator or their insurers to pay for damages. The minimum amount of protection required is set by national laws which in turn often depend on international treaty obligations. Over time the amount of this mandatory protection has increased, partially adjusting for inflation and partially allowing for an increased burden of responsibility to be passed on to nuclear operators.

Exclusive jurisdiction means that only the courts of the country in which the accident occurs has jurisdiction over damages claims. This has two effects; firstly it prevents what is known as jurisdiction shopping, whereby claimants try and find courts and national legislation more friendly to their claims, thus offering nuclear operators a degree of certainty and protection. Secondly it locates the competent court close to the source of damage meaning that victims do not have to travel far in order to lodge claims. This combined with exclusive liability ensures that relevant courts are accessible, even when the accident is transport-related and the relevant company based far away.

Limitation of liability protects individual nuclear operators and thus is often controversial.  By limiting the amount that operators would have to pay, the risks of an accident are effectively socialized. Beyond a certain level of damage, responsibility is passed from the individual operator either on to the State or a mutual collective of nuclear operators, or indeed both. In essence this limitation recognizes the benefits of nuclear power and the tacit acceptance of the risks a State takes by permitting power plant construction and operation, as with other major infrastructure.

Altogether these principles ensure that in the case of an accident, meaningful levels of compensation are available with a minimal level of litigation and difficulty.

International Framework

Governments have long recognized the risk of a nuclear accident causing transboundary damage. This led to the development of international frameworks to ensure that access to justice was readily available for victims outside of the country in which an accident occurs, so far as the countries are party to the relevant conventions. The number of different international instruments and their arrangements often give rise to confusion. Many of the major instruments, outlined below, have been amended several times and not all countries party to the earlier version have ratified the latter. The result is a patchwork quilt of countries and conventions and work towards harmonization of these regimes is ongoing.

Before 1997, the international liability regime was embodied primarily in two instruments:
- the IAEA's Vienna Convention* on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage of 1963 (entered into force in 1977), and
- the OECD's Paris Convention on Third Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy of 1960 which entered into force in 1968 and was bolstered by the Brussels Supplementary Convention in 1963**.

* Parties to Vienna Convention are mainly outside of Western Europe, including: Argentina, Bulgaria, Czech Rep, Egypt, Hungary, Lithuania, Mexico, Poland, Romania, Russia, Slovakia, Ukraine.  See also http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Conventions/liability_status.pdf
** The Paris convention includes all Western European countries except Ireland, Austria, Luxembourg and  Switzerland.  Parties to both Paris & Brussels are: Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, UK.  Paris only: Greece, Portugal, Turkey.  See also: http://www.nea.fr/html/law/paris-convention-ratification.html
http://www.nea.fr/html/law/brussels-convention-ratification.html 

These Conventions were linked by the Joint Protocol adopted in 1988 (see below) to bring together the geographical scope of the two*. They are based on the concept of civil law and adhere to the principles outlined above. Specifically they include the following provisions:

1. Liability is channeled exclusively to the operators of the nuclear installations (legal channelling means exclusive liability of operator, and protects suppliers);
2. Liability of the operator is absolute, i.e. the operator is held liable irrespective of fault, except for "acts of armed conflict, hostilities, civil war or insurrection";
3. Liability of the operator is limited in amount. Under the Vienna Convention the upper ceiling for operator liability is not fixed**; but it may be limited by legislation in each State.  The lower limit may not be less than US$ 5 million. Under the 1960 Paris convention, liability is limited to not more than 15 million Special Drawing Rights***  (SDRs - about US$ 23 million) and not less than SDR 5 million.
4. Liability is limited in time. Generally, compensation rights are extinguished under both Conventions if an action is not brought within ten years.  Additionally, States may not limit the operator’s liability to less than two years under the 1960 Paris convention, or three years under 1960 Vienna convention, from the time when the damage is discovered.
5. The operator must maintain insurance or other financial security for an amount corresponding to his liability or the limit set by the Installation State, beyond this level the Installation State can provide public funds but can also have recourse to the operator;
6. Jurisdiction over actions lies exclusively with the courts of the Contracting Party in whose territory the nuclear incident occurred;
7. Non-discrimination of victims on the grounds of nationality, domicile or residence.
8. Definition of nuclear damage covers property, health and loss of life but does not make provision for environmental damage, preventative measures and economic loss. This greatly reduces the total number of possible claimants, but increases the level of compensation available to the remainder. 

* parties:  http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Conventions/jointprot_status.pdf** The Paris Convention set a maximum liability of 15 million Special Drawing Rights - SDR (about EUR 18 million), but this was increased under the Brussels Supplementary Convention up to a total of 300 million SDRs (about EUR 360 million), including contributions by the installation State up to SDR 175 million (EUR 210M) and other Parties to the Convention collectively on the basis of their installed nuclear capacity for the balance. 

***An SDR is the unit of currency of the international monetary fund, it is approximately equal to 1.5 US dollars. 

The 1963 Brussels supplementary convention created a system of three tiers to provide for damages. Parties of the Brussels convention must also be party to the Paris convention which provides for the first tier of funds via the nuclear operator’s liability. Tier two requires the state to pay the difference between the operator’s liability (which is set under national law) and SDR 70 million. Tier three calls upon all parties to the convention to supply up to SDR 50 million. The maximum total amount available for compensation of the 1963 convention is therfore SDR 120 million, though note that this has since been increased - see below..

Following the Chernobyl accident in 1986, the IAEA initiated work on all aspects of nuclear liability with a view to improving the basic Conventions and establishing a comprehensive liability regime. In 1988, as a result of joint efforts by the IAEA and OECD/NEA, the Joint Protocol Relating to the Application of the Vienna Convention and the Paris Convention was adopted. Parties to the Joint protocol are treated as if they are Parties to both conventions. If an accident takes place in a country bound by the Paris convention which causes damages in a country bound by the Vienna convention, then victims in the latter are subject to compensation as per the Paris convention. The reverse is also true. Generally, no country can be a party to both conventions because the exact details are not consistent, leading to potential conflict in their simultaneous application. The Joint protocol was also intended to obviate any possible conflicts of law in the case of international transport of nuclear material. It entered into force in 1992.

The Vienna convention has been amended once in 1997, while the Paris convention and associated Brussels convention have been amended three times; in 1964, 1982 and 2004, though the latest amendment has not yet been ratified by enough countries to pass into force.

In 1997 governments took a significant step forward in improving the liability regime for nuclear damage when delegates from over 80 States adopted a Protocol to Amend the Vienna Convention. The amended IAEA Vienna Convention sets the possible limit of the operator's liability at not less than 300 million SDRs (about EUR 360 million) and entered into force in 2003 but with few members.  It also broadens the definition of nuclear damage (to include the concept of environmental damage and preventive measures), extends the geographical scope of the Convention, and extends the period during which claims may be brought for loss of life and personal injury. It also provides for jurisdiction of coastal states over actions incurring nuclear damage during transport.

There was no change in the liability caps provided for under either of the 1964 Paris or Brussels amendments or the 1982 Paris amendment. However, under the 1982 Brussels amendment, the second tier of finance (made available by the country in which the accident occurs) was raised to the difference between the operator’s liability and SDR 175 million (i.e. between SDR 160 million and 170 million ), while the third tier called upon all contracting countries to contribute up to SDR125 million so that the total amount currently available is SDR 300 million.

In 2004, contracting parties to the OECD Paris (and Brussels) Conventions signed Amending Protocols which brought the Paris Convention more into line with the IAEA Conventions amended or adopted in 1997. The principal objective of the amendments was to provide more compensation to more people for a wider scope of nuclear damage. They also shifted more of the onus for insurance on to industry. Consequently new limits of liability were set as follows: Operators (insured) €700 million, Installation State (public funds) €500 million, Collective state contribution (Brussels) €300 million => total €1500 M. The definition of "nuclear damage" is broadened to include environmental damage and economic costs, and the scope of application is widened. Moreover the 2004 amendment removed the requirement for a state to restrict the maximum liability of a nuclear operator, allowing for the first time states with a policy preference for unlimited liability to join the convention.

These Paris/ Brussels amendments are expected to be ratified by the contracting parties once they have consulted with industry stakeholders and then drafted the necessary amending legislation. They are not yet in force, and the old limits still apply (c €210 million, €360 million).

Also in 1997 IAEA parties adopted a Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage (CSC)*. This defines additional amounts to be provided through contributions by States Parties collectively on the basis of installed nuclear capacity and a UN rate of assessment, basically at 300 SDRs per MW thermal (ie about EUR 360 million total).  The CSC - not yet in force - is an instrument to which all States may adhere regardless of whether they are parties to any existing nuclear liability conventions or have nuclear installations on their territories, , though in the case where they are not party to either Paris or Vienna they must still implement national laws consistent with an annex to the CSC. In order to pass into force the CSC must be ratified by five countries with a minimum of 400 GW thermal of installed nuclear capacity. Currently the only ratifying party with significant nuclear generating capacity is the USA (c 300 GWt). Fourteen countries have signed it, now including India, but most have not yet ratified it. The CSC is set to enter into force on the 90th day after date of ratification by at least five States who have a minimum of 400,000 units of installed nuclear capacity (ie MWt). India will bring about 22 GWt operating and under construction. 

* www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Conventions/supcomp.html 

Table 1: Nuclear power States and liability conventions they are party to

Countries	Conventions party to		Countries	Conventions party to
Argentina	VC; RVC; CSC		Lithuania	VC; JP
Armenia	VC;		Mexico	VC
Belgium	PC; BSC; RPC; RBSC		Netherlands	PC; BSC; JP; RPC; RBSC
Brazil	VC		Pakistan
Bulgaria	VC; JP		Romania	VC; JP; RVC; CSC
Canada			Russia	VC
China			Slovak Republic	VC; JP
Czech Republic	VC; JP		Slovenia	PC; BSC; JP; RPC; RBSC
Finland	PC; BSC; JP; RPC; RBSC		South Africa
France	PC; BSC; RPC; RBSC		Spain	PC; BSC; RPC; RBSC
Germany	PC; BSC; JP; RPC; RBSC		Sweden	PC; BSC; JP; RPC; RBSC
Hungary	VC; JP		Switzerland	PC; RPC; BSC; RBSC
India	CSC*		Taiwan
Iran			Ukraine	VC; JP
Japan			United Kingdom	PC; BSC; RPC; RBSC
Korea			United States	CSC

PC = Paris Convention (PC). RPC = 2004 Revised Paris Protocol. Not yet in force
BSC = Brussels  Supplementary  Convention. RBSC = 2004 Revised Brussels Supplementary Convention. Not yet in force
VC = Vienna Convention. RVC = Revised Vienna Convention
JP = 1988 Joint Protocol.
CSC = Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage (CSC). Not yet in force.
 * India has signed the CSC but has not yet ratified it, and it is not yet clear whether their domestic liability law conforms with the requirements of the convention. 

 Beyond the provision of the above-mentioned instruments there is at least a tacit acceptance that the installation state will make available funds to cover anything in excess of these provisions, just as is the case with any major disaster - natural or other (the main industiral ones have been chemical plants). This has long been accepted in all developed countries. In the event of government payout to meet immediate claims however, the operator's liability is in no way extinguished, and taxpayers would expect to recover much or all of the sums involved.

However, several states with a significant current or planned nuclear capacity such as Japan, China and India, are not yet party to any international nuclear liability convention, so far relying on their own arrangements.

Beyond the international conventions, most countries with commercial nuclear programs also have their own legislative regimes for nuclear liability.  These national regimes implement the conventions’ principles, and impose financial security requirements which vary from country to country.  There are three categories of countries in this regard:  those that are party to one or both of the international conventions and have their own legislation, those that are not parties to an international convention but have their own legislation (notably USA, Canada, Japan, S.Korea), and those that are not party to a convention and are without their own legislation (notably China).

In 2010 both France's CEA and the IAEA called for an overhaul and rationalization of the several international conventions. In particular, the Paris Convention open only to OECD countries was unsatisfactory when reactor vendors and utilities from those countries were building plants in non-OECD countries. Partly due to the US channeling situation described below, the CSC is seen as a possible basis for an all-encompassing international regime 

US Framework

The USA takes a somewhat different approach, and having pioneered the concept is not party to any international nuclear liability convention, except for the CSC, which has yet to come into force. The Price Anderson Act - the world's first comprehensive nuclear liability law - has since 1957 been central to addressing the question of liability for nuclear accident. It now provides $12.5 billion in cover without cost to the public or government and without fault needing to be proven. It covers power reactors, research reactors, enrichment plants, waste repositories and all other nuclear facilities. 

It was renewed for 20 years in mid 2005, with strong bipartisan support, and requires individual operators to be responsible for two layers of insurance cover. The first layer is where each nuclear site is required to purchase US$ 375 million liability cover (as of 2011) which is provided by a private insurance pool, American Nuclear Insurers (ANI).  This is financial liability, not legal liability as in European liability conventions. 

The second layer or secondary financial protection (SFP) program is jointly provided by all US reactor operators. It is funded through retrospective payments if required of up to $112 million per reactor per acident* collected in annual instalments of $17.5 million (and adjusted with inflation). Combined, the total provision comes to over $12.2 billion paid for by the utilities. (The Department of Energy also provides $10 billion for its nuclear activities.) Beyond this cover and irrespective of fault, Congress, as insurer of last resort, must decide how compensation is provided in the event of a major accident. 

* plus up to 5% if required for legal costs. 

More than $150 million has been paid by US insurance pools in claims and costs of litigation since the Price- Anderson Act came into effect, all of it by the insurance pools. Of this amount, some $71 million related to litigation following the 1979 accident at Three Mile Island. 

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) requires all licensees for nuclear power plants to show proof that they have the primary and secondary insurance coverage mandated by the Price-Anderson Act. Licensees obtain their primary insurance for third-party liability through American Nuclear Insurers (ANI), and ANI manages the secondary insurance program also. Licensees also sign an agreement with NRC to keep the insurance in effect. American Nuclear Insurers also has a contractual agreement with each of the licensees to collect the retrospective premiums if these payments become necessary. A certified copy of this agreement, which is called a bond for payment of retrospective premiums, is provided to NRC as proof of secondary insurance. It obligates the licensee to pay the retrospective premiums to ANI if required. 

American Nuclear Insurers is a pool comprised of some 60 investor-owned stock insurance companies, including the major ones. About half the pool's total liability capacity comes from foreign sources such as Lloyd's of London. The average annual premium for a single-unit reactor site is $400,000. The premium for a second or third reactor at the same site is discounted to reflect a sharing of limits.

The nuclear operators' mutual arrangement for insuring the actual plants against accidents is Nuclear Electric Insurance Limited (NEIL) which is well funded (a $5 billion surplus) and cooperates closely with the American Nuclear Insurers pool. It was founded in 1980 and insures operators for any costs associated with property damage, decontamination, extended outages and related nuclear risks. For property damage and on-site decontamination, up to $2.75 billion is available to each commercial reactor site. The policies provide coverage for direct physical damage to, or destruction of, the insured property as a result of an accident [“accident” is defined as a sudden and fortuitous event, an event of the moment, which happens by chance, is unexpected and unforeseeable. Accident does not include any condition which develops, progresses or changes over time, or which is inevitable]. The policies prioritize payment of expenses to stabilize the reactor to a safe condition and decontaminate the plant site.

The Price Anderson Act has been represented as a subsidy to the US nuclear industry.  If considered thus, the value of the subsidy is the difference between the premium for full coverage and the premium for $10 billion in coverage. On the basis of data obtained from two studies - one conducted by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and the other by the Department of Energy (DOE) - the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimated that the subsidy probably amounts to less than 1 percent of the levelized cost for new nuclear capacity. 

The Price Anderson Act does not fully align with international conventions in that legal channelling is forbidden by state laws, so the Act allows only economic channelling, whereby the operator is economically liable but other entities may be held legally liable. This is a complication regarding any future universal compensation regime, though a provision was written into the CSC to allow the USA to join despite this situation. Hence the CSC may prove the most realistic basis for any universal third party regime.

Japan 

Japan is not party to any international liability convention but its law generally conforms to them. Two laws governing them are revised about every ten years: the Law on Compensation for Nuclear Damage and Law on Contract for Liability Insurance for Nuclear Damage. 

Plant operator liability is exclusive and absolute, and power plant operators must provide a financial security amount of JPY 120 billion (US$ 1.4 billion) - half that to 2010. The government may relieve the operator of liability if it determines that damage results from “a grave natural disaster of an exceptional character”, and in any case liability is unlimited. 

For the Fukushima accident in 2011 the government set up a new state-backed institution to expedite payments to those affected. The body is to receive financial contributions from electric power companies with nuclear power plants in Japan, and from the government through special bonds that can be cashed whenever necessary. The government bonds total JPY 5 trillion ($62 billion). The new institution will include representatives from other nuclear generators and will also operate as an insurer for the industry, being responsible to have plans in place for any future nuclear accidents. The provision for contributions from other nuclear operators is similar to that in the USA. The government estimates that Tepco will be able to complete its repayments in 10 to 13 years, after which it will revert to a fully private company with no government involvement. Meanwhile it will pay an annual fee for the government support, maintain adequate power supplies and ensure plant safety. 

In relation to the 1999 Tokai-mura fuel plant criticality accident, insurance covered JPY 1 billion and the parent company (Sumitomo) paid the balance of JPY 13.5 billion. 

Other countries

In the UK, the Energy Act 1983 brought legislation into line with earlier revisions to the Paris/Brussels Conventions and set a new limit of liability for particular installations. In 1994 this limit was increased again to £140 million for each major installation, so that the operator is liable for claims up to this amount and must insure accordingly. The majority of this insurance is provided by a pool of UK insurers comprising 8 insurance companies and 16 Lloyds syndicates - - Nuclear Risk Insurers. Beyond £140 million, the current Paris/Brussels system applies, with government contribution to SDR 300 million (c €360 million).  The government is proposing legislation which would require operators' insurance of EUR 1.2 billion. The level would initially be set at EUR 700 million specified under the 2004 Paris/Brussels Protocol (when it enters force) and then increased by EUR 100 million annually. Also, proposals allow for the government to provide waivers, indemnity, and government-provided insurance to nuclear operators in cases where commercial insurance or other financial security measures are unavailable in the private market. A public consultation on this is under way until the end of April 2011.

In mainland Europe, individual countries have legislation in line with the international conventions and where set, cap levels vary. Germany has unlimited operator liability and requires €2.5 billion security which must be provided by the operator for each plant. This security is partly covered by insurance, to €256 million.  France requires financial security of EUR 91 million per plant. Switzerland (which has signed but not yet ratified the international conventions) requires operators to insure to €600 million. It is proposed to increase this to €1.1 billion and ratify the Paris and Brussels conventions. 

Finland has ratified the 2004 Joint Protocol relating to Paris and Vienna conventions and in anticipation of this coming into force it passed a 2005 Act which requires operators to take at least € 700 million insurance cover. Currently the level is only EUR 300 million. Also operator liability is to be unlimited beyond the € 1.5 billion provided under the Brussels Convention. "Nuclear damage" is as defined in revised Paris Convention, and includes that from terrorism.

Sweden has also ratified the 2004 Joint Protocol relating to Paris and Vienna conventions.  The country's Nuclear Liability Act requires operators to be insured for at least SEK 3300 million (EUR 345 million), beyond which the state will cover to SEK 6 billion per incident.  However, Sweden is reviewing how this relates to the EUR 700 million operator's liability under the Joint Protocol amending the Paris convention, and has announced that it will seek unlimited operator liability.

The Czech Republic is moving towards ratifying the amendment to the Vienna Convention and in 2009 increased the mandatory minimum insurance cover required for each reactor to CZK 8 billion (EUR 296 million).

In Europe there are two mutual insurance arrangements which supplement commercial insurance pool cover for operators of nuclear plants. The European Mutual Association for the Nuclear Industry (EMANI) was founded in 1978 and European Liability Insurance for the Nuclear Industry (ELINI) created in 2002. ELINI plans to make EUR 100 million available as third party cover, and its 28 members have contributed half that to late 2007 for a special capital fund. ELINI's members comprise most EU nuclear plant operators. EMANI has some 70 members and covers over 100 sites, mostly in Europe. Its funds are about EUR500 million.

In Canada the Nuclear Liability and Compensation Act is also in line with the international conventions and establishes the licensee's absolute and exclusive liability for third party damage. Suppliers of goods and services are given an absolute discharge of liability. The limit of C$75 million per power plant set in 1976 as the insurance cover required for individual licensees was increased to $650 million in the Act's 2008 revision, though this has not yet passed.  Cover is provided by a pool of insurers, and claimants need not establish fault on anyone's part, but must show injury. Beyond the cap level, any further funds would be provided by the government.

Russia is party to the Vienna Convention since 2005 and has a domestic nuclear insurance pool comprising 23 insurance companies covering liability of some $350 million. It has a reinsurance arrangement with Ukraine and is setting one up with China. It has some "interim" bilateral agreements to cover entities working under safety assistance programs, but the legislative deficit here is a deterrent to Western contractors in particular..

Ukraine adopted a domestic liability law in 1995 and has revised it since in order to harmonise with the Vienna Convention, which it joined in 1996. It is also party to the Joint Protocol and has signed the CSC. Operator liability is capped at 150 million SDRs (c €180 million). Special provisions provisions apply to work on the Chernobyl shelter so as to extend coverage outside the Vienna Convention countries.

China is not party to any international liability convention but is an active member of the international insurance pooling system, which covers both first party risks and third party liability once fuel is loaded into a reactor.  China's 1986 interim domestic law on nuclear liability issued by the State Council contains most of the elements of the international conventions and the liability limit was increased to near international levels in September 2007.  It is also setting up a reinsurance arrangement with Russia which is more symbol than substance.

(For insurance of the plants themselves, Hong Kong-listed Ping'an Insurance Company accounts for more than half of China's nuclear power insurance market, with its clients including nuclear power plants in Guangdong, Jiangsu and both first- and second-phase projects of Qinshan Nuclear Power Station in Zhejiang. Four Chinese Insurance companies provided US$ 1.85 billion worth of insurance to Tianwan Nuclear Power Station in Jiangsu, most of which will be reinsured internationally.  About RMB 40 billion ($5.85 billion) insurance for the first two EPR units of the Taishan nuclear plant in being provided by Ping'an, All Trust, CPIC, PICC and others.  In late 2009 seven insurance companies and China Power Investment Corporation (CPI) signed a RMB 100 billion insurance cooperation agreement with China Guangdong Nuclear Power Co to insure the ten CPR-1000 units that CGNPC plans to build in the next three years.  In December 2007 Ningde Nuclear Power had announced a US$2 billion insurance agreement with Ping An Insurance Corp for its 4-unit CPR-1000 nuclear power project in Fujian Province.  All this is first party cover only.) 

The Indian government has introduced a bill which will bring the country's nuclear liability provisions broadly into line internationally, making operators liable for any nuclear accident, and protecting third party suppliers. Operators need to take out insurance up to the liability cap of $110 million, and other provisions are related to the IAEA's Vienna Convention (1997 amendment).

NUCLEAR ACCIDENT IN USA, AN EXAMPLE FOR KUDANKULAM REACTORS

 http://www.nirs.org/reactorwatch/aging/nrdcaccidentip1011.pdf

 The catastrophic accident at Japan’s Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant in March 2011 has resulted in a global re-examination of the safety of nuclear power and teaches us a lot about the risks of continued operation at the Indian Point reactor in New York. Just in the spring and summer of 2011, five nuclear power plants in the United States were damaged and underwent emergency shutdown due to flooding, earthquakes, tornadoes, and hurricanes. A review of the potential radiological consequences of a nuclear accident at Indian Point, the seismic hazards in its location, and cost estimates of a hypothetical accident shows just how dangerous the situation is.

 Among the 104 operating U.S. nuclear reactors, the two units at Indian Point, 34 miles north of Central Park, pose heightened risks. Very large populations could be exposed to radiation in a major accident, the reactors are located in a seismically active area, and their owner currently seeks to extend the reactors’ lives beyond their engineered 40-year lifespan.

1.An accident at Indian Point Unit 3 on the scale of Fukushima Daiichi could require the sheltering or evacuation of as many as 5.6 million people due to a fallout plume blown south to the New York City metropolitan area. People in the path of the plume would be at risk for receiving a whole-body radiation dose greater than 1 rem, which for an average individual results in a 0.3 percent increase in risk of premature death from cancer. An accident of this scale would require the administration of stable iodine to more than six million people (where people would be at risk for receiving a thyroid radiation dose greater than 10 rad).

2. An accident at Indian Point Unit 3 involving a full reactor core melt approaching the scale of Chernobyl could put people in New York City at risk for receiving a wholebody radiation dose greater than 25 rem, resulting in a 7 percent  crease in risk of premature death from cancer for an average individual. An accident of this scale would require the administration of stable iodine throughout the New York City metropolitan area, and put thousands at risk for radiation sickness in and near the Hudson Valley.

3. An accident at one of Indian Point’s reactors on the scale of the recent catastrophe in Japan could cause a swath of land down to the George Washington Bridge to be uninhabitable for generations due to radiation contamination. A release of radiation on the scale of Chernobyl’s would make Manhattan too radioactively contaminated to live in if the city fell within the plume

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s (NRC’s) approach to calculating seismic risk used to oversee Indian Point is outdated, and underestimates the danger of a damaging earthquake that could lead to a radiological release. NRDC estimates that, if the plume of radiation headed south from Indian Point to New York City, the cost of a severe accident at the plant would be 10 to 100 times higher than for the Fukushima Daiichi accident, where the cost for cleanup and compensation is projected to exceed $60 billion.

Radiological Releases in a Severe Accident

The Indian Point Energy Center is located in the village of Buchanan, New York, on the east bank of the Hudson River in Westchester County, 34 miles directly north of the center of Manhattan Island.1 Entergy Nuclear Northeast (with headquarters in Jackson, Mississippi), a subsidiary of Entergy Corporation (with headquarters in New Orleans, Louisiana), owns and operates 12 nuclear plants at 10 sites2, including the two operating Pressurized Water Reactor (PWR) units at Indian Point. Figure 1 shows a regional map of Indian Point with 10, 20, and 50 mile rings around the plant drawn. Figure 2 shows an aerial photograph of Indian Point with labels for the containment building3 for Unit 1, which was shut down in October 1974, and containment buildings for Unit 2, which began commercial operation in August 1974, and Unit 3, which began commercial operation two years later.

In Entergy’s 2010 “Indian Point Energy Center Emergency Plan,” the highest category of emergency is termed a “General Emergency” and is described as: “actual or imminent substantial core degradation or melting with potential for loss of containment integrity” with “the potential for a large release of radioactive material.”4 In 1981, Sandia National Laboratory conducted a study for the NRC that predicted a maximum of 50,000 immediate fatalities as far as 17.5 miles downwind and another 14,000 fatal cancers due to radiological releases from a damaged reactor at Indian Point. 5

The 9-11 attacks have caused additional concern that Indian Point could be the target of a terrorist attack. In 2004, a study by the Union of Concerned Scientists estimated as many as 44,000 near-term deaths from acute radiation syndrome and as many as 518,000 long-term cancer deaths could occur in people within 50 miles of Indian Point in the event of a severe accident.6

In order to fully appreciate the implications of a major accident at Indian Point, NRDC used the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) computer model HPAC (Hazard Prediction and Assessment Capability)7 to calculate resulting fallout plumes. The DoD software contains specific data on the

reactors at Indian Point (as well as at Fukushima Daiichi). Importantly, HPAC computes an inventory of radioactive elements that accumulate in the nuclear fuel rods of these reactors during normal operation. The DoD model captures many other important aspects of the release of radiation due to an accident at a nuclear power plant as well, including the radiological source term, the ambient weather, and data on nearby populations; these terms are defined below.

The source term for an accident at a nuclear plant is the type and quantity of radioactive materials (fission products and transuranic elements) released from the core of a reactor, first into the containment atmosphere and then from within the containment into the surrounding environment. This depends on the design of a reactor, its operating power at the time of the accident, the type of fuel, and the degree of damage to fuel, to containment, and to other reactor components in the accident. The DoD code models three degrees or types of nuclear facility accidents for PWR large

and dry containment leakage and failure. In progressing severity these are: gap release; in-vessel severe core damage; and vessel melt-through.

The PWR accident progression8 begins with loss of reactor coolant and failure of emergency core cooling, as occurred at Fukushima Daiichi due to Station Blackout and earthquake and tsunami damage. As the core heats up, fuel cladding (the metal sheath surrounding the uranium fuel) warps and cracks, resulting in release of the radioactivity located in the gap between nuclear fuel pellets and the cladding: the gap release. If cooling can’t be re-established, the core gradually melts and slumps to the bottom of the reactor pressure vessel (the core’s sealed steel container), called the in-vessel severe core damage. Finally, if the bottom head of the reactor pressure vessel fails, molten core debris can be ejected from the reactor pressure vessel and will react with the concrete floor below: the vessel melt-through.

Preliminary estimates of the amount of radioactive Iodine-131 and Cesium-137 discharged from the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant in the first intense weeks of its 2011 accident are 4.05E+06 Curies (Ci) and 3.24E+05 Ci, respectively. 9 These values are about one-tenth of the quantities of radioactive material released in the 1987 Chernobyl accident in Ukraine.10 Similarly, both the land area highly contamination with Cesium-137 and cancer deaths from radiation exposure are estimated to be on the order of 10 times less for Fukushima Daiichi than for Chernobyl.¹¹

Much of the radiation emitted from Fukushima Daiichi occurred on March 15, 2011, in a plume traveling northwest from the reactors, likely originating from Unit 2. Table 1below shows the DoD HPAC computer model’s source terms for progressively more severe accidents at Fukushima Daiichi Unit 2 and at Indian Point Unit 3. It is important to note that the thermal power of Indian

Point Unit 3 is greater than for Fukushima Daiichi Unit 2, so there is a larger quantity of fuel and radioactive material in the Indian Point reactor. Once the larger power of Indian Point Unit 3 is taken into account, (as shown in Table 1) that the amount of radioactivity calculated by HPAC in the source terms for Fukushima Daiichi and Indian Point are in fact similar. Also note that these calculations were performed  for a hypothetical accident at only one of Indian Point’s two operating reactors, and the accident scenarios did not involve radiation release from the spent fuel pools, unlike for Fukushima, which was a multi-unit accident with damage to spent nuclear fuel storage.

Given estimates of the amount of radiation actually emitted at Fukushima Daiichi, the severity of this accident would fall in between HPAC’s gap release and HPAC’s in vessel severe core damage source terms—a release of about 8percent of the core inventory calculated by the DoD’s HPAC code. The three Indian Point source terms calculated in HPAC bracket the Fukushima Daiichi accident:

1.      Gap release: About two-thirds of Fukushima Daiichi

2.      In-vessel severe core damage: Four to five times higher  than Fukushima Daiichi

3.      Vessel melt-through: nine times higher than  Fukushima Daiichi.

The size of an accident’s source term also depends on the time and duration of a radiation release. For these calculations, it was conservatively assumed that the release of radiation from the Indian Point reactor begins eight hours after an emergency shut-down, or “scram.” It is within this eight-hour period in the hypothetical accident that the reactor core loses cooling; damage to the fuel occurs as it is uncovered and overheats and containment is severely damaged. Importantly, during this eight-hour period between scram and the start of the fallout plume, the intensity of radioactivity in the fuel will decrease as shorter lived radio nuclides produced in the fuel during normal operation of the reactor decay. We conservatively modeled the plume resulting from gap release as emitted over one hour, the plume resulting from in-vessel severe core damage as emitted over two hours, and the plume resulting from vessel melt -through as emitted over ten hours.¹²

Ambient weather determines in what direction, how far, and how fast radioactive fallout would travel from Indian Point following a major accident. In NRDC’s analysis, we examined wind rose data for the nearby Poughkeepsie/ Dutchess County Airport, shown in Figure 3.¹³ The length of

the petals in the wind rose shows the frequency with which the wind blows from a given direction averaged over a 10 year period, and the relative size of the colored bands in a petal shows with what probability the wind blows at different speeds. Northerly and westerly winds are predominant at

Indian Point.Winds in the Hudson Valley are most often radiation result in an average radiation exposure of about 0.6 rem. The added risk of exposure to 1 rem to an average individual would increase a person’s chances of getting cancer or dying by about 0.3 percent, 5 rem, by about 1.4 percent, and 25 rem by about 7 percent.

As shown in Table 2, the most extreme accident consequences are for northerly winds carrying the plume to the New York metropolitan area. In the first stage of accident progression, the Gap Release scenario, about three million people would be advised to shelter or evacuate, to reduce the radiation dose and increased risk of cancer and genetic damage. For the next most severe scenario of in-vessel severe core damage, the computer model predicts over five million people could receive the radiation dose allowed for emergency lifesaving workers, which results in elevated 1.4%

increased cancer risk for an average individual. Finally, for a vessel melt-through, the model predicts six million people could receive a radiation dose greater than 25 rem, 10 million people could need stable iodine, and potentially thousands would be at risk for radiation sickness in the areas near to the reactor. Figure 4 through Figure 6 illustrate the fallout plumes from the DoD HPAC calculations for progressively severe accidents at Indian Point occurring at different times

of the day, using historical weather data for the month of October. Figure 7 shows a plume of radiation impacting New York City for the vessel melt-through accident scenario carried by light northerly winds. As can be seen from these figures, the ambient weather plays a large role in the direction and extent, and therefore the consequences, of fallout from an accident.

Seismic Risk

The NRC staff recently recognized that the current state of knowledge related to earthquake threats and accident modeling is not reflected in the regulations at many sites.¹⁶ In general, past attempts by the NRC to reconcile disparities between seismic science and nuclear regulations have not been comprehensive, imposing few or no requirements on previously-licensed reactors. In 1996, the NRC set forth two new seismic regulations, but only applied these new criteria to applications submitted after January 10, 1997.   The NRC’s attempts to revise seismic risks at U.S. reactors have suffered from two key flaws: either the scope or methods of the review were limited by scarce data, or the NRC showed deference to voluntary nuclear industry initiatives. When licensees volunteered to reassess earthquake risk, the NRC did not validate the results or even require licensees to report whether or not the studies were  actually completed.¹⁷ In a 2008 article by seismologists at Columbia University’s Lamont-Doherty Earth Observatory,18 the authors catalogued 383 earthquakes in the New York region and found concrete evidence for a previously unknown active seismic zone that runs from Stamford, Connecticut, to Peekskill, New York, passing less than a mile north of the Indian Point plant (Figure 8). Due to the zone’s proximity to other known seismic structures, the authors pointed out the possibility of an earthquake of magnitude 6 or higher along the zone.

The authors go as far as to say that the Indian Point site in particular “is clearly one of the least favorable sites in our area study from an earthquake hazard and risk perspective.” This study illustrates that new forms of sophisticated analysis, decades of new data on tremors, and improved

models together provide valuable insight into the extent to which current NRC regulations may be lacking. In April 2011, the NRC conducted an inspection at Indian Point Nuclear Generating Unit 2 and reported that the “licensee identified a number of potential vulnerabilities regarding firefighting following a Safe Shutdown Earthquake  (SSE). The potential vulnerabilities stem from the fact that

the fire protection system in non-safety related buildings, buried/underground fire headers, fire pumps, and the city water makeup supply are not seismically designed which could result in a loss of portions of the fire protection system following a SSE.”19 A SSE is the maximum earthquake

potential for which certain structures, systems and components important to safety are designed to remain functional.

Currently, the NRC is conducting a process begun in 2005 to evaluate seismic hazards based on new data for the Central and Eastern United States; this process is called GI-199. A determination of the site-specific seismic hazards and associated plant risk are planned for the next phase of GI-199. However, the overall process appears to be falling short of implementing the already-known seismic criteria established in 1996.On the surface, the results of GI-199 only seem to establish how these new seismic evaluations are considered through a cost-benefit analysis. But if the finding within GI-199 emerges that Indian Point is indeed lacking in its ability protect against earthquakes (an August 2010 NRC report revealed that Indian Point Unit 3 had the highest probability of core damage of any plant in the country)²⁰then the implications are compounded by the power plant’s

proximity to large populations.

Fukushima and the Potential Economic Costs of an Accident at Indian Point

The cost of the nuclear accident at Fukushima Daiichi is enormous. In August of 2011 Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO), the utility which owns the Fukushima Daiichi reactors and other plants impacted by the Great East Japan Earthquake and tsunami, posted a $7.39 billion loss for its April to June quarter.21 This loss includes a projection of costs through the final phase of TEPCO’s roadmap to achieve cold shutdown of the Fukushima reactors between October 2011 and January 2012. TEPCO's estimated losses, detailed in the assessment, included:

1.      $680 million operating loss due to suspended operations at nuclear plants and replacement with thermal generating capacity

2.      $1.37 billion cost for resources to bring the crisis at the plant under control

3.      $1.15 billion compensation for mental distress caused by the accident

4.      $1.32 billion compensation to companies that became inoperable due to the evacuation orders and other reasons

5.      $1.84 billion compensation to people who could not work because of the accident

6.      $870 million compensation for losses caused by shipment restrictions on agriculture and marine products due to radiation contamination. On September 9, 2011, the Japanese government announced that it planned to spend $2.9 billion on cleaning up residential areas contaminated by the Fukushima accident.  Japan’s Chief Cabinet Secretary Osamu Fujimura described the government’s plan to build a facility to store radioactive material in Fukushima Prefecture before it is removed to a final disposal site.²² These costs are in addition to multibillion capital losses from destruction of the reactors themselves and loss of the value of their future generating capacity. And more recently, a Japanese government panel reviewing TEPCO’s finances projected that the utility company would eventually face damages of at least $59 billion.²³ Real estate and economic activity within the New York area is among the most valuable in the world. The damage claims from radioactive contamination of this region would be vast. In the 2004 Union of Concerned Scientists’ study, theeconomic damages within 100 miles of Indian Point were calculated to exceed $1.1 trillion for the worst cases evaluated, using NRC methodologies. Estimating the full cost of a severe accident at Indian Point is difficult, but it can be inferred from two factors that the cost of an accident at the power plant would indeed be one to two orders of magnitude higher than the eventual total cost of the Fukushima Daiichi accident.

First, it is likely that winds blew some of the fallout from Fukushima Daiichi eastward out to sea, reducing the radiation dose to nearby populations and diminishing contamination of land. Second, the Fukushima Daiichi accident was located in a predominantly non-urban area. Neither of these

considerations would hold for Indian Point.  One factor affecting the cost of an accident at Indian

Point would be the extent of the ground concentration of radioactive materials downwind from the reactor. Following the Chernobyl accident, cesium-137, a radionuclide with a half-life of about 30 years, contaminated over 1,000 square kilometers to a level greater than 40 Curies per square  kilometer, a level of contamination at which the population was encouraged to leave permanently. The accident at Fukushima Daiichi produced a zone of similar levels of contamination of cesium-137 to the northwest of the plant over about 175 square kilometers. NRDC’s calculations for a Fukushima-scale accident and for a Chernobyl-scale accident at Indian Point, on a day with typical, northerly winds, are shown in Figure 9. As can be seen from this figure, an accident at one of Indian Point’s reactors on the scale of Chernobyl’s would make Manhattan too radioactively contaminated to live in if the city fell within the plume.

Endnotes

1 The Indian Point site measures 239 acres and is centered at 41° 16’ 11” latitude, 73° 57’ 8” longitude (41.269722 N, 73.952222 W).

2 In addition to the two units at Indian Point, Entergy Nuclear owns and operates: Arkansas Nuclear

(Units 1 and 2) near Russellville, Arkansas; Cooper Nuclear Station near Brownville, Nebraska;

FitzPatrick in Oswego, New York; Grand Gulf Nuclear Station near Port Gibson, Mississippi; Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station in Plymouth, Massachusetts; Palisades Power Plant in Covert, Michigan; River Bend Station near St. Francisville, Louisiana; Vermont Yankee in Vernon, Vermont; and Waterford 3 in Taft, Louisiana.

3 Of the three types of containment structures for PWRs – Large Dry, Subatmospheric, and Ice

Condenser – Indian Point Unit 2 and Unit 3 have steel-lined reinforced concrete Large Dry containment structures with hemispherical domes and flat bases.

4 Frank Phillips and Brian Sullivan “Indian Point Energy Center Emergency Plan,” (Revision 10, Entergy Corporation, December 2010), pp. D-5, D-17.

5 Subcommittee on Oversight & Investigations, Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, U.S. House of Representatives, “Calculation of Reactor Accident Consequences (CRAC2) For U.S. Nuclear Power Plants Conditional on an ‘SST1’ Release,” November 1, 1982. In July, 2011 the Union of Concerned Scientists analyzed documents it obtained under the Freedom of Information Act from the NRC, and found that an updated analysis of severe nuclear accidents – NRC’s State of the Art Reactor Consequence Analysis or SOARCA – did not differ substantially from the 1982 study. http://allthingsnuclear.org/post/8243137367/nrc-study-shows-the-serious-consequences-of-a.

6 Edwin S. Lyman, Chernobyl on the Hudson? The Health and Economic Impacts of a Terrorist Attack at the Indian Point Nuclear Plant, (Washington, D.C.: Union of Concerned Scientists, Commissioned by Riverkeeper, September 2004) p. 4.

7 Hazard Prediction and Assessment Capability, version 4.0.4 ( Washington, D.C.: Defense Threat Reduction Agency , April 2004). The HPAC documentation describes the code as: “…a counter proliferation, counterforce tool that predicts the effects of hazardous material releases into the atmosphere and its collateral effects on civilian and military populations. HPAC assists warfighters

in destroying targets containing weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and responding to hazardous

agent releases. It employs integrated source terms, high-resolution weather forecasts and particulate transport algorithms to rapidly model hazard areas and human collateral effects.”

8 L Soffer, S. B. Burson, C. M. Ferrell, R. Y. Lee, J. N. Ridgely, “Accident Source Terms for  ight-Water Nuclear Power Plants: Final Report (NUREG-1465),” (Washington, D.C.: Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, February 1995), pp. 2-3.

9 Masamichi Chino, Hiromasa Nakayama, Haruyasu Nagai, Hiroaki Terada, Genki Katata And  Hiromi Yamazawa, “Preliminary Estimation of Release Amounts of 131I and 137Cs Accidentally Dischargedfrom the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant into the Atmosphere,” Journal of Nuclear ScienceAnd Technology, 48, no. 7, p. 1129–1134, 2011.

10 L. Devell, S. Guntay, and D. A. Powers, “The Chernobyl Reactor Accident Source Term: Development of a Consensus View,” (Issy-les-Moulineaux, France: Committee on the Safety of Nuclear Installations, OECD Nuclear Energy Agency, November 1995).

11 Frank N. von Hippel, “The radiological and psychological consequences of the Fukushima Daiichi accident,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 67, no.5, pp 27-36.

12 NUREG-1465, pg. 9.

13 Ricardo K. Sakai, David R. Fitzjarrald, Chris Walcek, Matt J. Czikowsky, and Jeffrey M. Freedman, ”Wind Channeling in the Hudson Valley, NY,” (2006), p. 1.

14 Manual of Protective Action Guides and Protective Actions for Nuclear Incidents, (Washington, D.C.:Office of Radiation Programs, United States Environmental Protection Agency).

15 Manual of Protective Action Guides and Protective Actions for Nuclear Incidents, pg. 2-12.

16 Recommendations for Enhancing Reactor Safety in the 21st Century – The Near-Term Task ForceReview of Insights from the Fukushima Daiichi Accident, (Washington, D.C.: Nuclear RegulatoryCommission, July 12, 2011), pp. 25-30.

17 Supplement 4 to GL 88-20, “Individual Plant Examination of External Events (IPEEE) for Severe Accident Vulnerabilities, 10 CFR 50.54(f)” Nuclear Regulatory Commission, August 29, 1989.

18 LR Sykes, JG Armbruster, W Kim, L Seeber, “Observations and Tectonic Setting of Historic and Instrumentally Located Earthquakes in the Greater New York City-Philadelphia Area,” Bulletin of the Seismological Society of America 98, no.4 (August 2008), pp. 1696-1719.

19 Indian Point Nuclear Generating Unit 2 - NRC Temporary Instruction 2515/183 Inspection Report 05000247 1201 1009, Lawrence T. Doerflein, Chief Engineering Branch 2, Division of Reactor Safety, Nuclear Regulatory Commission, May 13, 2011.

20 “Generic Issue 199 (GI-199), Implications of Updated Probabilistic Seismic Hazard Estimates in Central and Eastern United States on Existing Plants, Safety/Risk Assessment,” August 2010.

21 Kazumasa Takenaka, “TEPCO Posts 571 Billion Yen Net Loss in Quarter,” The Asahi Shimbun, August 10, 2011

22 “Decon Plan May Cost ¥220 Billion,” The Japan Times, Saturday, September 10, 2011.

23 Tsuyoshi Inajima and Yuji Okada, “Tepco Faces ‘Zombie’ Future as Fukushima Claims Set to Surpass  $59 Billion,” Bloomberg, September 30, 2011.

24 Jase Bernhardt, Victoria Kelly, Allison Chatrchyan, and Art DeGaetano, The Natural Resource

Inventory of Dutchess County NY: Chapter 2 Climate and Air Quality, Revised October 2010, pp. 13-14.